Now they use slices or array pointers with any element type instead of
requiring byte pointers.
This is a breaking enhancement to the language.
The safety check for overlapping pointers will be implemented in a
future commit.
closes#14040
It seems like the original code of setsockopt is not effective because
i catch the EINVAL branch when uncomment this code, it should call
setsockopt before the bind call.
This should fix issue #14900.
Co-authored-by: Qun He <hawkbee@qq.com>
This fixes a bug in std.net caused during the introduction of
meta.assumeSentinel due to the unfortunate semantics of mem.span()
This leaves only 3 remaining uses of meta.assumeSentinel() in the
standard library, each of which could be a simple @ptrCast([*:0]T, foo)
instead. I think this function should likely be removed.
Here's what I landed on for the TLS client. It's 16896 bytes
(max_ciphertext_record_len is 16640). I believe this is the theoretical
minimum size, give or take a few bytes.
These constraints are satisfied:
* a call to the readvAdvanced() function makes at most one call to the
underlying readv function
* iovecs are provided by the API, and used by the implementation for
underlying readv() calls to the socket
* the theoretical minimum number of memcpy() calls are issued in all
circumstances
* decryption is only performed once for any given TLS record
* large read buffers are fully exploited
This is accomplished by using the partial read buffer to storing both
cleartext and ciphertext.
The read function has been renamed to readAdvanced since it has slightly
different semantics than typical read functions, specifically regarding
the end-of-file. A higher level read function is implemented on top.
Now, API users may pass small buffers to the read function and
everything will work fine. This is done by re-decrypting the same
ciphertext record with each call to read() until the record is finished
being transmitted.
If the buffer supplied to read() is large enough, then any given
ciphertext record will only be decrypted once, since it decrypts
directly to the read() buffer and therefore does not need any memcpy. On
the other hand, if the buffer supplied to read() is small, then the
ciphertext is decrypted into a stack buffer, a subset is copied to the
read() buffer, and then the entire ciphertext record is saved for the
next call to read().
* Export invalidFmtErr
To allow consistent use of "invalid format string" compile error
response for badly formatted format strings.
See https://github.com/ziglang/zig/pull/13489#issuecomment-1311759340.
* Replace format compile errors with invalidFmtErr
- Provides more consistent compile errors.
- Gives user info about the type of the badly formated value.
* Rename invalidFmtErr as invalidFmtError
For consistency. Zig seems to use “Error” more often than “Err”.
* std: add invalid format string checks to remaining custom formatters
* pass reference-trace to comp when building build file; fix checkobjectstep
The entire 'path' array would get written to the formatting function,
when it should instead be treated as a regular zero-terminated string.
Note that this doesn't handle abstract paths on Linux, those paths
*start* with a \0 byte and are hence treated as empty strings instead.
But fixing that would require more adjustments than just formatting, in
particular to getOsSockLen().
* std lib tests are passing on x86_64-linux with and without -lc
* stage2 is building from source on x86_64-linux
* down to 38 remaining uses of `usingnamespace`
We already have a LICENSE file that covers the Zig Standard Library. We
no longer need to remind everyone that the license is MIT in every single
file.
Previously this was introduced to clarify the situation for a fork of
Zig that made Zig's LICENSE file harder to find, and replaced it with
their own license that required annual payments to their company.
However that fork now appears to be dead. So there is no need to
reinforce the copyright notice in every single file.
Some parsers interpret these as octal, some don't, and the confusion can lead to vulnerabilities.
Return error.NonCanonical when parsing IPv4 addresses with 0 prefixes.
r00ster91